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Prima facie there is no reason that philosophy in the phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition 
should not admit of practical application, and Marx and Freud are exemplary in this regard.  
Despite the ethical turn in the late eighties, however, deconstructive criticism retains a 
reputation for an anti-realism and obscurantism that preclude meaningful engagement with 
ethical problems.  Kelly Oliver is determined to avoid charges of ineffability in Technologies 
of Life and Death, where her first paragraph ends with a sentence beginning ‘In this book, I’ 
(p.2) and her introduction takes the form of an extended abstract.  Her statement of intent 
announces an examination of the relationship between technology and ethics with particular 
attention to the processes of life and death, suggesting a focus on practical issues of 
fundamental importance to all human beings.  The monograph is divided into three parts: Sex 
Machines (Chapters 1 and 2), Medusa Machines (Chapters 3 and 4), and Death Machines 
(Chapters 5 to 7).   
 
Chapters 1 and 2 follow a similar and effective format.  They begin with a contemporary 
controversy, the sex testing of South African athlete Caster Semenya in 2009 and the rapid 
growth of assisted reproduction into a billion-dollar industry in the US respectively.  They 
then bring Derrida’s deconstruction of a conceptual opposition to bear on the issue, free-
determined in one and nature-technology in the other.  Exegesis of Derrida is accompanied 
by a contrast of his views with those of another commentator, first John Harris and Jürgen 
Habermas and then Harris and Freud.  Finally, a conclusion on the subject which favours 
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Derrida is reached.  The lesson from the Semenya case is that the grown is as prone to 
borderline instances as the made and an ethical stance which fails to recognise the underlying 
similarity between grown and made, free and determined, will be at fault.  The lesson from 
the business of assisted reproduction is that no matter how many mothers are involved in the 
manufacture and rearing of a child – Oliver points out that an ovum may be created from the 
eggs of two women, a fertilised egg implanted in a third, and the child raised by a lesbian 
couple – current and foreseeable-future technology still requires that the child grow in the 
womb of a woman and be given birth to by that woman.  Here the conclusion is much more 
Oliver’s original thought than an application of Derrida, and all the more interesting for it: 
before adopting an ethical stance on the difference between natural reproduction and assisted 
reproduction one should realise that both processes are subject to a high degree of 
contingency and that ultimately ‘all of us are born out of the body of a woman, which cannot 
be separated from whatever that may mean for us’ (p.73).   
 
The impression gained from the abstract is that Part Two will link the initial concerns with 
birth (cloning and motherhood) with the subsequent concerns with death (execution), but, 
Chapter 3 digresses to the place of women in the animal-human and beast-sovereign 
conceptualisations, introducing Derrida’s The Beast and the Sovereign (2009 & 2011).  
Chapter 4 focuses on two little-discussed works of Julia Kristeva, a catalogue entitled Visions 
capitales (1998) and the lecture “A Father is Being Beaten to Death” (2006).  The respective 
exegeses of Derrida and Kristeva are informed, candid, and lucid, but in failing to connect the 
first and third parts, the second – which is about neither birth nor death – transforms the book 
into a collection of essays rather than a sustained argument.  The exegesis of Derrida’s The 
Beast and the Sovereign continues into Part Three, where the loss of clarity and direction is 
exposed as Oliver addresses ‘what Derrida “calls the globalization of the autopsic model” of 
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sovereignty in relation to the counterfable of the elephant autopsy’ (p.139).  Suddenly, we are 
deep in the territory of deconstruction at its most abstract and recondite, very far from the 
relevant, enlightening, and accessible discussions in Part One.   
 
Chapter 6 resumes the discussion of technology, specifically that associated with execution, 
but the philosophical thread has been lost by this stage and her conclusion – that the animal-
human conceptual opposition has been employed to justify violence to human as well as other 
animals – comes as something of a non-sequitur.  The final chapter exhibits a return to the 
rigour of Part One, discussing Kant and Derrida’s respective views on the death penalty, and 
the role of sovereignty and the sovereign in capital punishment.  There is at least one analysis 
which is sufficient to dispel the claims of those who maintain that deconstructive criticism is 
worthless.  Oliver interprets Levinas’ emphasis on responsibility and the priority of the other 
over the self (the hyperbolic ethics advanced by Derrida) in terms of Kant’s maxim of ought 
implies can.  Oliver asks: ‘What if ought implies cannot?  What if our obligations always 
outstrip our intentions’ (p.190)?  The idea is that there are an infinite number of things I 
ought to do and that not only does my finite life prevent me from meeting these obligations, 
but that meeting one – donating money to a particular charity – often prevents me from 
meeting another – donating that money to another equally worthy charity.  Derrida’s aim is, 
as Oliver notes, to negotiate a path between Kant and Levinas.   
 
The conclusion of Chapter 7 claims that a psychoanalytic approach to Derrida’s ethics – 
entailing a conception of human beings as marionettes, influenced by forces beyond their 
control – can forge a link between ethics and politics.  The proposal, which is both 
fascinating and disturbing, is regrettably made without supporting evidence or argument.  
Nor, as a conclusion to the work as a whole, is the notion of a psychoanalytic supplement to a 
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hyperbolic ethics illuminated in terms of the technologies of birth and death.  Ultimately, 
Oliver fails to do more than reframe the questions she has discussed, and there is an absence 
of any practical engagement with ethical dilemmas.  The fault lies with too detailed a focus 
on The Beast and the Sovereign and too little of her own contribution.  As such, Technologies 
of Life and Death is a missed opportunity.       
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